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Abstract
A model of growth based on innovation is presented. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs
cover the fixed cost of innovation out of operating profits and sell in a
Chamberlinian world of monopolistic competition with free entry. Innovation builds
on and attributes to firm-specific knowledge. Moreover, there can be spillovers
among firms. The higher market power of firms, the lower is the rate of innovation
because of dynamic advantages of specialization. Imperfect competition distorts the
static allocation of labour over sectors and firms, but need not result in a
suboptimal growth rate. Economic integration between symmetric countries fosters
growth if profit margins decrease with market shares.
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Introduction
The role of monopolistic competition in static economic theory diverges from that
in dynamic theory. In Chamberlin's view, monopolistic competition creates static
inefficiencies because prices are set above marginal cost. In Schumpeter's view
however, monopoly profits are a necessary incentive for innovation. Many recent
growth models [e.g. Romer (1987), Aghion and Howitt (1990) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991a, 1991b)] are based on the latter view. In these models, the larger
the monopoly power of the firm is, the higher profits are, the larger the incentive
to innovate and the faster the economy grows. However, certain aspects of
Chamberlin's theory easily become obscured.
Here we show how this effect of increased market power on growth can be
reversed: larger profit margins reduce growth in our model. Firms produce a
differentiated productvariant each but compete on the same national market which
is moreover open to new firms. The production of each variant requires its own
specific knowledge and each firm has to pursue its own specific Research and
Development to improve its productivity. If firms can raise their profit margins,
new firms with new productvariants are stimulated to enter the market. In the new
situation more firms have to incur a firm-specific cost of innovation. Hence there is
clearly a trade-off between product variety and innovation-driven growth on
economy-wide level. The larger product variety is, the more costly macrceconomic
growth is.
In this paper, we are interested in the positive and normative relation between
monopoly power, product diversity and growth, thus extending the issues
investigated by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to a dynamic setting. The main
mechanisisms in our model are the dynamic advantages of specialization due to the
existence of economies of scale and the effects of entry on the competitive
environment of firms. The empirical importance of the latter channel is shown by
Geroski (1989). One specific reason for changes in profit margins may arise ín a
process of trade liberalization. Increased competition from foreign suppliers
reduces profit margins and the number of active firms in the integrated economy
will decline, as is shown by Smith and Venables (1991). In our model economic
growth can be affected as well.
Section 1 presents the model in which the growth rate and the number of
productvariants are endogenous. Section 2 deals with the influence of parameter
changes on both variables in the market equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the
efficiency of the market equilibrium. In section 4, the effects of trade and
endogenous profit margins are considered. Section 5 compares the results from this
paper with the conclusions reached by Grossman and Helpman (1991b), which are
representative for the recent growth models mentioned above.3
1. The Model
In this section we set up a model for a closed economy with a competitive sector
producing a homogenous good and a monopolistic sector with N firms each
supplying a different good.
Consumers
Consumer preferences are given by
U- f 1 c~-v e-a` dt ,
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Intertemporal utility (1.1) is of the CRRA type with constant pure rate of time
preference B and elasticity of intertemporal substitution l~p. Instantaneous utility c
is a composite good according to (1.2) of the homogeneous goad Y and the
differentiated good X.' Good X is an index of N differentiated goods consumed.
Goods from different producers are imperfect substitutes with constant elasticity of
substitution ]I(1-~) ~ e. This functional form to model monopolistic competition is
due to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Important to note is the role of variety per se.
Under symmetry (1.3) reduces to X- 1Vt'~'~~'(Nx). This reflects the "taste for
variety": choosing between two consumption bundles of the same size Nx,
consumers prefer the bundle with most variety (highest N).
Maximization of utility subject to the usual budget constraints yields:
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' A more general specification is discussed briefly in section 2.4
where r is the nominal rate of interest. Equation (1.4) gives the downward sloping
demand curve for good x;. Equation (1.5) gives the demand for the homogeneous
good which is a fraction I-a of total expenditures on consumption. P~ and PX are
the price index of consumption and the price index for the optimal consumption
bundle X respectively. Equation (1.5) is the standard Ramsey formula describing
the optimal timepath of consumption as the difference between the real rate of
interest and the pure rate of time preference multiplied by the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
Firms
The homogeneous good Y is manufactured using labor (Lr) only. The technology
applied is characterized by hY, which is given and equal for each firm in the sector.
No firm in the Y-sector has specific knowledge and good Y sells at a its cost price.
Hence we can write:
Y - hrLr, (1.7)
w 18 pr- h . ( . )
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Each of the N monopolistic firms manufactures one variety (brand) of the set of
differentiated products employing a single primary factor of production, labour. As
one brand is distinct from another, the production and management of each
requires its own specific knowledge. To accumulate this knowledge, firms have to
pursue their own research and development (RBcD). They can not directly apply the
results of other firms' RBr.D efforts, as these are tailored to the specific situation of
other firms. However, the ideas developed by other firms may be of indirect use:
they can inspire own RBcD activities. Firms aim at developing firm-specific
knowledge, but as a side-product they create some more generally applicable
knowledge and they can learn from other firms. Following Scott (1989) we label
this the learning externality.
Besides the spillovers of knowledge among firms, we take into account spillovers
from production activities to research activities within one company. Empirical
investigation points out the importance of this learning by doing (e.g. Detouzos et
al. 1989). It provides a firm an advantage in research for the brand he produces.
Hence, firms have their own history and position determined by the specific
product they produce. Geroski (1991) provides empirical evidence on the
interaction between the use and the creation of innovations as well as on the size of5
cross-industry spillovers.
The technology of firm i to manufacture x; goods is taken as:
xi - hi L:i' (1.9)
where Ls; is labour time spent on the production line and h, is labour productivity.
We can imagine two forms of Research and Development. Process innovation
increases physical output per unit of input. Quality innovation raises the quality of
the firm's product. If we interpret x; in (1.3) as measured in quality units, both
forms of innovation can be modelled as increases in h;. Innovation allows one unit
of labour to produce more physical units of a given quality or a higher quality of a
given quantity. Labour (LR;) is employed to improve productivity in the production
lines (h;):
Íti - ~KiLRi' (1.10)
The returns from RBcD depend on productivity parameter ~ and two kinds of
"knowledge capital" captured by K;. First, current research builds on the firm's
own RBrD experience, measured by h;, which forms firm-specific knowledge.
Second, it uses general knowledge that spills over from other firms. We take the
average productivity (h) in the economy as a measure of "general knowledge
capital":
K; - h; f 1~~h , 0 c,G c 1. (1.11)
The larger parameter ~, the larger is the learning externality. An alternative
measure would be an index of productivity or quality levels summed over firms,
e.g. Nh. Grossman and Helpman take this position, while Lucas (1988) chooses an
average level as indicator. Here, we prefer the specification with the average level,
but this assumption is not necessary for most of our results. It only emphasizes the
the firm-specific nature of the RBcD process.
Furthermore, note that there are no diminishing returns in RBr,D activities with
respect to the level of knowledge capital. This means that infinite growth in quality
or productivity can be sustained by allocating a fixed amount of labour to the
firms' RBcD labs. For some products this dces not seem realistic unless we
interpret quality improvement in a broad sense. A producer of office equipment
who gradually moves from producing typewriters to producing personal computers
or a camage builder who develops a petrolfueled car can both be considered as6
entrepreneurs who develop the quality (labour productivity) of their own product
using firm- specific advantages. The assumption that there are no diminishing
return with respect to reproducible factors of production is of course essential to
allow for endogenous growthZ.
Monopolistic firms set their price and choose the level of production and research
efforts to maximize the present value of profits, subject to the constraints described
by demand curve (1.4) and by equations (1.9)-(1.11). Profits are defined by
revenue less labour cost:
1r; - x! Pxi -( Lx~ t LRi t.f ) w.
w
Both LR; and f are fixed cost components, with the difference that the size of the
former can be chosen, while the latter is given for the firm representing
management cost, cost of gathering market information, etcetera. The level of
induslry demand (X) and the industry pricc index (PX) arc lakcn as given by thc
firm. Substituting the constraints and denoting the costate variable by 1`, the
Hamiltonian for this dynamic optimization problem reads:
H- ~PxXI "] (h;Lx;)n -(Lx; t LR; tf) w t.i;f(h;} Í~~h) Lx;.(1.13)
The first-order conditions for the maximization problem are:
t1 ÍPXXt-"] X~ t h; - w,
~1~~K; - w,
n ÍP X~-"] x~-t
L:~ }~;~Lx; f.i; - r.i~. x
Eliminating the costate variable and rewriting yields:
pxl - rlh~'
(1.12)
(1.14)
(1.15)
As a more general case (L9) and (Ll0) need not be linear in L, but this assumption
would make it impossible to find a closed-form solution to the model while the main
conclusions are not affected.
Furthermore, (I.10) and (I.l I) can be replaced by
h~ - (K;h;-;L~; , K - h
without even affecting the closed form solutions of the model variants in this paper.7
~ K~ Lx~ f~ h~ -(1 - h~~Kt~hJ
- r- px~ . (1.16)
h. h. h Pr;
Firms apply a constant mark-up over unit labour cost as can be seen from (1.15).
The rate of profit is equal to (llq)-1-(e-If~. Equation (1.16) equates the real rate
of interest (RHS) to the sum of the marginal rate of return from investment in
productivity improvement (first term LHS) and the growth rate of value of the firm
due to own RBr.D efforts (second term LHS). This must be read as a no-arbitrage
condltion: if the equality in (1.16) is not satisfied, the firm would face an
unbounded supply of borrowing funds or investing in the capital market would be
strictly better than investing in RBr,D to raise productivity.
Equilibrium
To focus on the basic mechanisms at work we examine the case of symmetry
across firms. The firm's price is taken as numeraire (p,;-1 and I7~,~p~,-0).
Symmetry implies:
--, 1-~
L -N(LI; fLR; }f) tLy,
(1.17)
(1.18)
where L is total employment, equaling the fixed labour supply in labour market
equilibrium. If we denote the growth rate of productivity in each firm by g ~~,~h;,
then K~~K~ - h~~h~ - h~h - z~~x; - g and from ( 1.10) and (1.17) follows
- 8 LR; - ~, , ~ - f~(1 -~V). (1.19)
Combining this with (1.18) and (1.16) results in
r - ~ ( L ~Y - f 1 - ~j g . (TECH) (1.2~)
This relation sulmmarizes theJbehaviour of individual firms indicating what rate of
return r can be realized at a given rate of growth g. It is depicted by the
TECHnology line in figure 1.1. It slopes downward because a higher growth rate
requires expanding employment in research of which the private marginal
productivity is smaller than its economy-wide average productivity due to the
learning externality (,y ~ ~.
The TECH-line can be seen as the demand shedule for savings and it has to be
confronted by the supply of savings which is ruled by consumers' intertemporale
preferences according to the Ramsey formula ( 1.6). For a constant number of firms
(N) and by the choice of numeraire, Px is constant [see (1.4)]. If moreover the
labour supply and its allocation over both sectors are constant over time, which
will be the case as shown below, then output of the homogeneous good Y is
constant and X grows at the rate of productivity growth g[see ( 1.3) and (1.9)]. The
relative price PYlPX is being driven up at the same rate to maintain the expenditure
share of the homogeneous good constant at 1-a. Hence consumption grows at rate
Clc-og and the consumer price index at rate P~P~-(I-a)g [see (1.2) and (1.5)].
Substituting this into (1.6), the Ramsey rule reads:
r-ef(Po tl-a)g- (PREF) (1.21)
This relation is depicted by the PREFerences line in Figure 1.1. The relation
between the required reward on savings (r) and the growth rate of X is positive for
two reasons. Fírstly, marginal utility is declining in consumption (p ~ 0), i.e.
intertemporal substitution is imperfect. Consumers wish to smooth consumption
over time unless they are compensated by a high rate of return on savings. They
ask a rate of return with a premium pag for the postponement of consumption.
Secondly, the marginal utility of X is declining in X when Y is constant (if OC 1-
aG 1), i.e. intratemporal substitution between X and Y is imperfect. Even if
consumers would be risk averse (p-0), growth in the X-component of
consumption, while the Y-component of consumption is constant, lowers the value
of an additional X-good in the future. This loss is only accepted if it is
compensated by the premium (1-a)g.
~~~ insert Figure 1.1 ~`~`~`
As we ignored "depreciation" of knowledge capital or firm-specific knowledge, we
can restrict Figure 1.1 to nonnegative growth ra[es (negative growth rates would
imply negative employment, see 1.10). The intersection of the PREF-line and the
7'ECH-line determines the equilibrium growth for a given number of firms and a
constant (symmetric) allocation of labour. If consumers become more thrifty
(decline in B or p), the PREF-line moves downwards and growth rises. An economy
with ample labour per monopolistic firm (L-Ly)~N and a low fixed cost f is
relatively productive (TECH-line is situated far to the right). This means that more
variety (higher N) lowers the rate of return (by shifting the TECtt-line to the left).
The reason is that with more product variety, a larger part of the economy's labour
force has to be employed in research activities to generate the firm-specific9
knowledge needed to improve all brands at a given rate. The economy benefits
from a larger variety of consumption goods, but the economy also faces a larger
fixed cost - given by N(LR, f,~ - N(gl~ff) - to improve the total basket of
consumer goods (c).
The model is completed by a free-entry condition determining the number of firms
(and productvariants) in equilibrium. As long as profits are positive, new firms
enter the market. Costs associated to entry are ignored to simplify the analysis.'
By substituting (1.9), (L15), (1.18) and ( 1.19) into (1.12), profits reduce to
ni - ~ ( (1 -t)) L~Y - ~ - f ~.
Noting that II(1-r1lJ~E, the price elasticity of demand, as before, zero (positive)
profits imply:
L -L
N Y 2 E~~ t f~ " 7r~ 2 ~, (ZP) (1.22)
Condition (1.22) with equality sign will be referred to as the zero profit (zP)
condition. As noted above, the terms in brackets are total fixed cost for an
individual firm. This cost needs to be covered out of operational profits. Hence for
given fixed cost, firms employment (L-L,.)IN must be larger the lower profit
margins are (i.e. the higher price elasticity e is) to avoid losses.
Substituting zP condition (1.22) into TECH-relation ( 1.20) gives the No-ENTRY
condition in the (r, g)-plane, depicted in Figure 1.2:
~ 2(e-1)(f t(e-t~r)8 ~ n~ 2 0. (NO-ENTRY) (1.23)
~`~`~` insert Figure 1.2 ~`~`~`
If the TECH-line and the PREF-line intersect at a point above the NO-ENTRY line,
e.g. at point A in Figure 1.2, the supply of savings equates the demand for savings
but finns realize positivc profits. This immcdiately induces entry which shifts the
TECH-line to the left. Only when profits are driven to zero, the incentive to set up
new firms is eliminated. Hence point E describes long-run equilibrium.
The equilibrium is stable when the No-ENTRV-line slopes flatter than the PREF-line
which requires pa t 1- o~ e- tG. In static monopolistic theory, the existence of
' More realistic is perhaps assuming a sunk cost that has to be incurred to create or
liquidate a new firm. This complicates the analysis (e.g. transitional dynamics come into
play), without altering the steady state results.io
a fixed cost is sufficient to guarantee stability: entry of new firms crowds out
labour supply per firm, thus raising the share of fixed cost in total cost and
reducing profits until they are vanished. In the dynamic model of monopolistic
competition we are considering, total fixed cost per firm, given by (LR, ~-,flw, is not
exogenously given, but can be reduced by diminishing research efforts. Crowding
out of labour supply per firm by the entrance of new firms needs not lead to a
reduction in instantaneous profits if firms decide to reduce research employment
(LR;) to offset the larger burden of the fixed management expenditures. This
decision will not be taken if the intertemporal gains from research are high, which
situation is captured by the condition pa f 1- a~ e-~. If the LHS of this
condition is high, the rate of return (r) required by investor-consumers is relatively
sensitive lo changes in 1hc growth rate of the economy (sec 1.21). A small
reduction in growth-generating research activities in the aggregate economy reduces
the interest rate such that lower interest cost keep up the attractiveness of
investment in research. If the price elasticity E is low, a small shift from
employment in research to employment in production is costly because it causes a
Iarge fall in the firm's price. The same applies for a high weight of the external
effect (~ large): then the difference between marginal and average productivity of
research labour is large and reducing LR; raises sharply the average returns to
research.
Now the model is completed we can find the closed form solutions of some key
variables. The growth rate is solved from (1.21) and (1.23). As profits of
monopolistic firms are zero in no-entry-equilibrium and as goods market
equilibrium requires that all manufactures goods are consumed, total consumption
expenditures equal total labour income. Thus from (1.5) 1-a-P,.Y~Lw. Substituting
(1.7) and ( 1.8) and rewriting gives the intersectoral labour allocation (1.26). The
number of firms is then solved from (1.22).
(e-1)CÏ - e (1.24)
g-(Po f 1 - a) - e f~~
N-((paf] - o) - e f Vil oL (1.25)
l (Pafyr-a)f - ~(~ J E
Ly - (1-a)L. (1.26)
From (1.25) it is clear that the fixed costf has to be large enough to guarantee an
equilibrium with a positive number of firms: (paf~i-a)~ 1 B. This condition for
existence of the no-entry equilibrium has to be imposed together with the condition
for stability of the no-entry equilibrium already explained above.it
Since there are no transitional dynamics, these solution are reached immediately.
From (1.26) it is clear that labour allocation is constant over time when L is
constant.
2. Comparative statics
The following features of the market equilibrium can be directly read off from
(1.24) and (1.25).
1. The more patient consumers are (small B or p) or the more productive labour is
in innovative activities (large ~), thefaster the economy grows.
This is a common feature of endogenous growth models. Producers maximize the
value of the firm. If consumers are willing to save more, borrowing conditions are
easier and the cost of innovation falls. If research activities become more
productive, the returns to innovation rise. Both situations provide an incentive to
shift labour from production activities to research activities.
2. The rate of growth is constant, even when labour supply grows at a constant
rate.
As in all growth models, growth is sustained because the returns to investment do
not diminish. Here, investment takes the form of research and development. Ideas
invented in research labs add to the stock of knowledge. The benefits from this
accumulation of knowledge for future RBr.D remain large enough for firms to
maintain employment in research and to keep therefore the rate of innovation
constant.
An interesting feature of the model is the fact that the size of the labour supply L
dces affect the number of brands produced, but it dces not affect the growth rate of
the economy. This contras[s with some other growth models based on RBcD (e.g.
Romer 1987, 1990, Aghion and Howi[t 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991) and
with some growth models based on learning by doing (e.g. Romer 1986, Rebelo
1991). In these models a larger size of the work force means a higher growth rate.
Consequently population growth is somewhat problematic as it means continuously
increasing growth rates. Here population growth affects growth and welfare by
sustained increases in the number of varieties supplied (see 1.25), but a constantI?
rate of population growth is compatible with a constant growth rate of output'.
The reason for this result is that average rather than aggregate knowledge matters
in research (cf. Lucas, 1988). Growth in the workforce (G) gives rise to the
emergence of new productvariants, thus enlarging the aggregate stock of knowledge
Nh. If this aggregate stock influences the productivity of firm-specific innovation
efforts, the incentive to grow may rise.
3. The lower the opportunities for monopoly profits (large E or~, the faster the
economy grows.
Two parameters indicate market power. A large price elasticity E implies a high
degree of price competition, low mark-ups and low profits. As a consequence, the
number of firms is small and the aggregate economy faces a smaller cost to
upgrade its total basket of consumption goods. This positive influence of
competition on growth of output can be labeled as a Chamberlin effect. The higher
the price elasticity, the smaller is the difference between marginal revenue (which
equals marginal cost) and the price set by the firm (which equals average cost due
to the zero-profit condition). In static theory this drives the firm downwards its
average cost function towards a higher level of output. Here it drives the economy
to a higher growth rate of output.
The second parameter reflecting market power is the fixed cost f. A fixed cost can
be seen as a barrier to entry. Large fixed costs deter entry, keep the number of
firms small and raise growth rates as more labour per firm is available to employ
in growth generating R8r.D activities. This effect can be called Schumpeterian as
the fixed cost limits the number of suppliers in the market and the operating profits
reaped from selling in a monopolistic market can be directed at new innovation.
4. There are dynamic advantages of specialization.
As we have already stressed before, a rise in the rate of growth is often
accompanied by a decline in the number of product variants produced in the
economy. More precise, from (1.24) and (1.25) it can be derived that for each shift
in one of the parameters 8, ~, e orf such that g rises, N will fall. If (E-1J~ 9, this
` If population G grows at rate g~, the Ramsey formula becomes: r-P,IP,-Btg~tp(CIc-gJ.
All equations for the supplyside remain unchanged. From (1.25) follows 1V~N-g~. Hence
from (1.4) Px~Px--8c~(c-1) and from (1.3) X~JC-g~lntg. Then l~,JPY-gifg. From (1.5)
p~P,-(1-ulRf(1-o~rtJBc and from (L2) C~c-ag~lq. Substituting these results into (1.23)
yields
(e-1)Cf - B - !(P-1No~n-1) t1~g~
g - (Potl -a) - e f Vr13
also applies to a shift in p'. Growth is fostered by a decline in variety as less
labour has to be employed in firm-specific RBcD activities to upgrade the aggregate
consumption basket.
S. lntersectoral preferences affect the required rate of return when the there is
innovation in only one of the two sectors. A shift in preferences from the goods of
one sector to the goods of the other changes the balance between consumption
goods which are in fixed supply and consumption goods of which supply is
growing. Remind the discussion of equation ( 1.2I). A decline in a has two opposite
effects. First i[ reduces the weight of X-goods in utility which form the growing
component in consumption. For a given rate of innovation (g) this implies that
consumers benefit from a smoother consumption pattern and they require a lower
rate of return on postponed consumption. Secondly, growth in differentiated
consumption goods makes the Y-good, of which the supply is constant, relatively
scarce, and diminishes the marginal utility of additional X-goods becoming
available in future. At a smaller a the growing scarcity of Y is weighted more and
consumers require a larger rate of return.
If p~ 1, which is generally accepted as the empirically relevant case, the former
effect dominates the latter and a decline in a lowers the sensitivity of the required
rate of return to changes in the growth rate. If p c I, the opposite holds. Only if
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is ttnity (p-1) there is no change in the
required rate.b
6. lntersectoral preferences can affect the rate of innovation only by changing the
required rate of return. A rise in preferences for the differentiated good lowers
innovation. The reason is that the NO-ENTRY condition is independent of a. Profits
tend to rise when expenditures shift to the sector where firm-specific research is
carried out. This invokes entry of new firms until the zp-condition is satisfied
again. As profit margins and labour productivity do not change, there is, for given
r, only one combination of the level of employment per monopolistic firm and the
h
The effect of a shift in ~ is ambiguous on g as well as on N. The reason is that at a higher
,y firms internalize less of the benetits of innovation which tends to lower the rate of
innovation, but [hey benefit from more spillovers which tends to rise the rate of
innovation. To see this in (1.24), note that j'~ll(1-tG).
This explains why Grossman and Helpman (1991a) do not find this effect as they assume
logarithmic utility (p-1).14
rate of innovation that is both optimal for the firm' and that yields zero profits.
This combination is independent of o. If intertemporal substitution is inelastic
(p J 1, which is implied by the stability condition on the entry process), the
required rate rises with a and innovation falls as borrowing conditions for firms are
tighter (see point 5 above).
This result hings on the fact that knowledge spillovers depend on the average stock
of knowledge. If spillovers would depend on some index of aggregate knowledge,
e.g. Nh, the rise in the number of firms (N) invoked by the increase in a is a
source of increases in the level of knowledge and the incentives for innovation may
rise. If this effect dominates the effect via the required rate of return, innovation
may rise".
We conclude this section by some remarks on the specification of intersectoral
preferences. In (1.2) we assumed the special case of Cobb-Douglas specification. A
more general form would allow a elasticity of substitution between X and Y, say K,
not necessarily equal to one (but less than e, see Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). This is
only in a very special case compatible with balanced growth. With K~ 1, spending
on Y as a fraction of total consumption expenditures is no longer exogenous at a
but depends on the relative price PX~P,.. This price will fall as long as there is
innovation in the differentiated good sector only. This changes ceteris paribus the
expenditure share and invokes a continous reallocation of labour across the sectors
over time. The innovating sector would replace completely the homogeneous goods
sector in the long run if the types of goods are good substitutes (K 11) or
employment in the innovating sector would approach zero in case of low
substitutability (K c 1). In the first case the economy would experiences a transition
towards the situation described in the model above with a-1, while in the second
case GNP-growth would eventually peter out. Only when technological progress in
the Y-sector keeps pace with innovation in the X-sector (h1JhY-g), the relative
price remains constant over time so that the spending share remains constant.
3. Welfare implications
In static market theory, monopolistic competition is related to some inefficiency
(see Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the welfare
' i.e. that satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (1.16).
e This in fact happens in Grossman á Helpmann (1991a).15
properties of the dynamic model. The optimum growth rate and the optimum
number of products produced can be determined by maximizing (1.1) subject to
(1.2), (1.3) and ( 1.7)-(1.11). When all firm start with the same productivity and
quality level, it is optimal to produce the same quantity of each brand and to
improve each product at the same rate (g). Hence equation (1.17) and (1.18) apply.
We can substitute the constraints into the utility fuction and solve the integral to
! NUn .h(t) .(L~N -L M ~a(~ vl~ ~fi-olfr-v1
U(t) - ` y~.. -ó~~-f) hYLY .
(1-p) [B - (1-p) og)
Maximizing with respect to g, N and LY gives:
g, - (e-1){f - B (3.1)
(Pv f 1 -o) - e'
N, o(p-1) f 1 e oL (3.2)
- ( o(p-1)f - B~~ e - (1-0) ,
LY - ( e-1 1(1-a)L. (3.3)
le-(1-o)J
These optimum results differ from the equilibrium growth rate, the number of
brands in the market economy and the market allocation of labour [equations
(1.24)-(1.26)] because of two distortions. The first is the learning ezternality
(tG 1~. The second is what may be called "technological duality", i.e. the
existence of a sector where no innovation is possible alongside a sector where it is
(a~l).
Consider the first distortion separately by considering the case tG~O and a-1.
Knowlcdge spillovers among firms cause equilibrium growth to be less than
optimal (g c g~`) and variety to be larger than optimal (N1N~`). In the market
economy, firms only internalize the contribution of their research efforts to the
firm-specific knowledge valuable in own future research (h;), they do not
internalize the contribution to the stock of general knowledge capital that is
valuable for all firms in the economy (h).
With only the second distortion (tG-O, aG 1), the equilibrium rate of growth is
optimal but the number of differentiated goods produced is too low and the
traditional sector is too large. Moreover, this distortion is larger, the larger
monopoly power is (smaller e):
e
N~ - e -(1-0) N~v~-o ' N~i-o
e -1 ~ L.
LY - e -(1-0) LY Y
(3.4)
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Differentiated goods are priced above marginal cost, while the homogeneous good
sells at cost price. This biases the relative price against differentiated goods.
Starting from the market equilibrium, it is optimal to reallocate labour from the
traditional sector to the differentiated sector as it offers the opportunity to raise
variety which is valued by consumers ("consumersurplus effect"). Potential market
entrants base their decision on prospective profits they can gain, but they do not
take into account the effect on the profits of existing firms, nor the effect on
consumer surplus arising from a larger variety. As entry raises the number of firms
and the fixed cost of the economy as a whole (N,fl, this "profit destruction effect" is
clearly a cost to society. At a larger number of firms there is less labour available
per firm and firms make losses. However, these losses are socially acceptable as
the consumer surplus effect dominates the profit destruction effect. Only if a-1
these two effects cancel. Then no externality arises from the fact that prices are set
above marginal revenue because all prices contain the same mark-up and relative
prices are not affected by mark-up pricing.
The welfare properties of the model without spillovers (~i-~ are analogous to
those of the corresponding static model in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, section I). Also
in the static model the equilibrium number of firms is too low and too much of the
economy's resources is allocated to the non-differentiated sector if the elasticity of
intersectoral substitution equals one. Output per firm is set optimally in the market
equilibrium which corresponds to optimality of equilibrium growth in our dynamic
model.
4. International Trade
Empirical studies (e.g. Feder 1982, Romer 1989, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1991)
suggest that trade and the openess of an economy matters for growth. In Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1990) and in Grossman and Helpman (1991), international
integration fosters growth by the exchange of ideas or "knowledge capital" (i.e. by
communication) and by reducing redundancy in research activities.
In this section we examine how trade can affect the growth rate and the number of
firms by other forces. Trade allows producers to serve new foreign markets but
they see their share in the home market decline because foreign competitors enter
the market. Increased competition may affect profit margins and incentives for
innovation.Trade and transport cost
Consider a world economy consisting of v countries, all similar to the two-sector
economy described in section 1. We restrict the analysis to the case that the
countries share identical preference structure, population size, cost structure,
etcetera. The only difference is the scala of national product variants supplied.
Each country experienced its own history and developed its own specific products.
Trade allows traditional Y-goods and differentiated X-goods to cross national
borders. In a symmetric trade model there is no incentive for inter-industry trade in
Y-goods nor for labour mobility or intertemporal trade. However, intra-industry
trade in X-goods will take place as each country sells its own specific goods.
Utility is given by (1.1)-(1.3) but now the integral in (1.3) is taken over the entire
scala of products available from all trading partners. This means that all product
variants enter subutility symmetrically, irrespective of whether they are home-
produced or imported. From (1.4) it is easy to derive demand for a home-produced
good (x,H) for an import good (x;F):
-s
x~ - X Px~ j-H,F
r P
x
P - N~n~-`~ ( (v-1)(P:)I-` t (P:X)j-` )~r s~.
x
(4.1)
where v is the number of integrated economies, so v-1 in case of autarky and v-2
in case of a two-country trade regio. Superscripts H and F denote home and
foreign market respectively, so p~;F is the price of a good x; produced in one
country but sold (and bought) in another, i.e. the price of imported and exported
X-goods.
We assume that monopolistic firms face the same production technology as in the
previous section, but they have to incur a specific cost related to exports, referred
to as transport cost:
j-H,F (4.2)
(4.3)
Parameter r relates the required transportation labour services L,; to the required
labour input in production for the foreign market (L~;r). Price discrimination
between different markets is possible. The returns from innovation are decribed by
(1.7). Dynamic optimization by firms then implies:18
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Equations (4.4) and (4.5) state that prices set by firms
by a constant mazk-up over unit labour cost. Equation
arbitrage condition (1.16).
The Y-sector is described by (1.7) and (1.8). With symmetry accross firms, labour
mazket equilibrium requires:
L- 1V ( Lr~ t Li, f Lri } LRi '.f ) t LY (4.7)
in both markets are featured
(4.6) is the analogue of no-
Pri
(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.6)
Substituting (1.17), (1.19) and (4.7) into (4.6) and takingp~;" as the numeraire, one
finds again the TECH-line:
r - {( v~ -fl - ViB. (TECH) (4.8)
Profits are given by total revenue from both markets less total labour cost:
n. - pyh.LH f pFhiLF -(LytLFtL fL t~w.
~ zi , zi ri ri zi zi ri Ri
As can casily br checkcd by suhstitutinK (1.19) and (4.3)-(4.5) Ihis reduccs to the
same expression for profits as before. Hence the No-ENTtzY condition reads again
r - (s-1)~f' f (e-Vi18. (NO-ENTRY) (4.I)
which is exacdy the same relation as in section 1[equation (1.23)]. The PREF-
relation satisfies (1.21). Therefore we can conclude that the semi-reduced form
equations of the model (PREF, TECH and ZP) do not change by the introduction of
international trade. This means that trade dces not affect the equilibrium growth
rate or the number of firms.
The rate of innovation (g) is unchanged essentially because the productivity of
research activities is unchanged: it depends on parameter ~ and the average stock of
knowledge in the integrated economy h. When the costs of innovation do not
change, there is no incentive to alter the research intensity.
The number of firms remains the same essentially because profit margins on19
production activities remain the same: the mark-up is determined by price elasticity
e (or rl). Hence for given fixed cost gl~ff, there is a unique number of firms,
independent of the number of integrating countries, for which each firm has
available enough labour in production activities9 to be able to pay for the fixed
cost without making a loss or profit.
Trade or transport costs only affect the allocation of labour within production lines
between production for the home market and production for the foreign market.
Transport cost explain why the market share of home producers exceed the market
share of foreign producers in a national market (Venables 1987). Using (4.1), (4.4)
and (4.5) one finds that x~x -(1 tr)a x'F
A reduction in transport cost reduces the price of foreign goods (see 4.5), the
demand for imports rises and firms increase their production for foreign markets
relative to their production for the home market.
From these remarks it is clear that there are two amendments to the model which
make trade affect growth. The first is to assume that trade creates additional
knowledge spillovers above the average stock of knowledge. The second is to allow
profit margins to vary with the number of firms in the integrated economy.
Trade and knowledge spillovers
One can imagine that international trade and communication among countries
increases the productivity of research. Trade prevents redundancy in research and
enables countries to specialize in research directions in which they have an
international advantage. This is equivalent to assuming that ~, the productivity in
research, rises by integration. As a result the growth rate rises. Communication
faciliates learning from the knowledge accumulated by other countries. This implies
an additional spillover effect which can be modeled by adding a foreign spillover
term in (1.11), e.g.:
K~ - h~ f ~ hy t ~(v-1)hF. (1.11')
1-~4 1-~
Under symmetry accross countries this assumption makes an increases in
communication equivalent to a rise in ,~ which has an ambiguous effect on the rate
of growth (see before). The important difference between ( l.ll) and (1.11') is that
in the former it is the average stock of knowledge that matters, while in the latter it
is some index of knowledge summed over countries. This modification will
introduce parameters representing the size of the economy in the closed form
y L,i~ f(1 fr)L„` - x,"Ih; t (1 fr)x,~~h, - paL~Nusing (4.1), (4.4), (4.5) and XPX-aLw.20
solution for the growth rate. The relavant parameter here is v, the size of the
integrated economy measured by the number of countries. Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) base their models on this effect with the
result that the size of the labour force in the integrating countries is a determinant
of growth.
As cxplained before, we think that in case of differentiated products and firm-
specific research average knowledge is a more appropiate measure, even in an
international setting. Therefore, we turn to the second amendment to the model
which dces not rely on additional knowledge spillovers.
Variable Mark-ups
The second is to assume that profit margins are not constant but decrease when
foreign competitors enter the market. This can be modeled along the lines of Smith
and Venables (1988). They extend the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic
competition and perform calibration experiments on economic integration in
Europe. In their static setting, a reduction in trade barriers causes exit of firms and
an increased firm scale. We now show that the latter effect translates into an
increased innovation rate in our dynamic setting.
Monopolistic competition in the preceeding analysis had the feature of constant
markups, determined by the fixed price elasticity faced by individual firms. The
same elasticity of substitution applied to each pair of brands. Moreover, individual
firms neglected the effect of their own price setting on the aggregate price index,
which is indeed reasonable to assume if the number of firms is large.
Smith and Venables (1988) assume that the total sector of differentiated goods is
subdivided in product groups or industries. Product varieties from one product
group are better substitutes than goods from different product groups. Hence
competition within a product group is stronger than among product groups.
Producers do not neglect the effect of their behaviour on industry demand as each
holds a significant share in the market for the product group they belong to. For
convenience we do not subdivide the differentiated goods sector but assume here
that the share of each firm in total demand for differentiated goods is perceived as
relevant in setting prices or, in other words, that the number of firms (I10 is not too
large.
The demand curve for an individual firm (4.1) in market j can be rewritten using
the optimal allocation of consumption between X-goods and Y-goods from section
3:
(4.10)zi
The first term in brackets represents total demand for monopolistic goods (JQ.
Firms consider not only the direct effect of p,; on z;, measured by -e, but also the
indirect effect on own demand through the effect on PX, captured by`o -(1-e)s;
where s; is the share of firm i in demand for X. The price elasticity perceived by
firm i in market j is thus (positively defined):
-e -s;(e-1). j-H,F (4.11)
The markup rate set over unit labour cost is now (e,H-I)-' in the home market and
(e;F-I)~' in the foreign market instead of (e-1J~'. For simplicity consider the case
without transport costs (r-0). Then, under the symmetry assumption, s,"-s,F-s;
and e,"-e;F-e;. Moreover, s; is equal to the inverse of the number of firms in the
integrated economy, which can be written as:
s. - 1 , (4.12)
' vN
As before, we solve the model by reducing it to the Preferences relation and the
No-entry relation in the r,g diagram. The PREF relation is still given by (1.21) and
the TECH line by (1.20). To find the No-ENTRY relation, replace e in (1.22) by e;
and substitute (4.12), which yields:
LN Y-(e vN 1 l C}
f),
(zp) (4.13)
Combining (1.20), (1.26) and (4.13) gives the No-ENTRY condition:
-~
r - ~,E oL- } e-1
aL - ~g - ~f.
l 8r~ f f v
s`~`~` insert Figure 4.1 ~`s`s`
(NO-ENTRY) (4.14)
Figure 4.1 shows No-ENTRV curve (4.14) together with pREF-line (1.21). To
guarantee a stable equilibrium it must be assumed again that the slope of the
former is flatter than the slope of the latter for nonnegative growth rates. Note that
the necessary stability condition from section 3(E-~ C pa-F-1-v) is a su„~icient
condition in the present case as the slope of the NO-ENTRY curve (4.14) is given
by:
'o Smith and Venables (1988) include also anticipated price (or quantity) responses of other
firms in the industry.zz
oL Z ~ E
E ( oL f (e-1)(8~~f.f)rv ~ - ~.
The intercept of this curve is:
-~
(e(1 } (e-1)f 1 - 1 {f.
I` I` o vL J
This intercept increases in v, which represents the transition from autarky to free
trade or the proces of economic integration. The No-ENTRY curve moves up and
becomes flatter, while the PREF-line remains in place. Hence integration fosters
growth.
Though the model is very stylized due to the absence of trade barriers (r-0) and
the symmetry accross the trade partners, it is intuitively appealing. Allowing more
foreign producers on the national market, so that foreign competition hits home
producers more fiercely, producers see their share in national markets decline and
they will reduce profit margins. Some firms have to close down. Surviving firms
absorb the resulting labour surplus, which is employed partly in additional research
activities. Hence integration forces countries to specialize and to capture dynamic
economies of scale in the sense that the number of differentiated products produced
in each country (1~ declines. However, consumers benefit from a wider range of
consumption goods (vl~ and a higher rate of growth.
Before concluding this section it is instructive to make a comparison with the
model in the previous sections. The larger the integrated economy is as measured
by its productive labourforce vL, the higher is the rate of growth and the less are
the effects of integration. This contrasts to the results in section 2. Countries with a
large labour force (L) contain many firms, each having a market share that is
already rather low. Removing trade barriers then affects only moderately the
position of firms in the market and the change in their profit margins. A similar
reasoning applies to the effects on the rate of growth within a regio of integrated
countries. If the number oF integrated countries (v) is large, then adding a new
trade partner hardly affects growth within the regio as the increase in competition
is relatively small. Formally, when v approaches infinity, the NO-ENTRY curve
(4.14) coincides with the No-ENT[tY-line of section 1(1.23).
5. Concluding remarks
We presented a model of growth based on innovation. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs
cover the fixed cost of innovation out of operating profits and sell in a23
Chamberlinian world of monopolistic competition with free entry. The most
important conclusions are that (1) a rise in monopoly power hurts growth but
increases product diversity, (2) a rise in monopoly power increases the inefficiency
of the two-sector market economy and (3) the growth rate of the economy need not
accelerate if there is population growth. Conclusions (1) and (3) are in contrast
with comparable growth models as covered by Romer (1987), Aghion and Howitt
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b), while conclusion (2) has not
been examined before in a dynamic model as far as we know.
To point out the reason for this contrast, it is instructive to compare the model of
this paper with the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) "quality ladder" model which
is closest to our model. First we note that in both models the quality or
productivity in a sector of industry is being improved continuously. In the quality
ladder model the incentive to pursue research and development activities (with
stochastic returns) is to take over the position of the leading firm: each sector of
industry faces a constant market share (due to separability of the utility function),
but only the firm within the sector that is able to bring out first a new generation of
the sector's product captures demand and profits of the product's market. In our
setting different industries compete on the total market. An improvement of a
firm's quality level relative to other firms' quality levels enlarges its market share
which is an incentive to innovate. Secondly, in both models, private research
efforts yield general knowledge as a side product that is a public good. However
each firm has to employ researchers to transform the general knowledge into
designs that are applicable in the industry. This implies that the more firms
(product variants) there are, the more labour is required in research to improve to
total basket of product variants in the economy. In the quality ladder model the
number of firms is fixed and normalized to one, so this effect is not visible. In our
model entry of new firms is possible which links the degree of monopoly power to
the growth rate. Finally, in the quality ladders model, RBtD is memoryless and it is
irrelevant to which product variant a firm targets his research, the entire stock of
knowledge capital is useful in each reseach lab. We take RBcD as firm-specific and
not all ideas from other firms are useful but a firm can learn from the average level
of knowledge in the economy.
Various extensions of the present work are interesting. First, asymmetry accross
firms and accross countries can be examined which will shed some light on
convergence and catch-up. Secondly, innovation could be modelled as a
discontinuous stochastic process to come closer to Schumpeter's view of growth.
The elegant approach of Grossman and Helpman (1991b) seems an appropiate
starting point for this extension, although the combination of firm-specific24
knowledge and assymmetry accross firms will give rise to a more complicated risk
structure and arbitrage behaviour on capital markets. Thirdly, as we like to
examine the effects of market power and competition on growth, further analysis
should tackle issues like cartels, collusion, mergers and other realistic aspects of
competition among similar firms. This however requires a departure from the
paradigm of monopolistic competition in its strict sense. Unfortunately,
macrceconomics lack a generally accepted theory of imperfect competition, which
is of course also the reason that this paper can yield results that differ substantially
from the results in related work.
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